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Introduction
[A] psychology of judgment and decision making that ignores intuitive
skill is seriously blinkered.1
Judicial intuition is misunderstood. Labeled as cognitive bias, it is held
responsible for stereotypes of character and credibility. Framed as mental
shortcut, it is blamed for overconfident and mistaken predictions.
Depicted as flashes of insight, it takes credit for unearned wisdom.
The true value of judicial intuition falls somewhere in between. When
judges are making judgments about people (he looks trustworthy) or the
future (she will be the better parent), the critics are correct: intuition
based on past experience may close minds. Once a judge recognizes a
familiar pattern in a few details, she may fail to see the whole fabric’s color
and design. When judges are solving problems, the critics are, however,
incorrect: it is in this process that judicial intuition has the power to open
minds. Visual and verbal cues point to similarities, triggering an intuition
or recognition of potential parallels, unlocking patterns and unblocking
paths. When judges are solving problems—and they are doing so when
they are finding, interpreting, applying, and making law—both the lawyers
* © Linda L. Berger 2013. Family Foundation Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Boyd School of Law. Thank
you to the Boyd School of Law and former Dean John White for supporting the writing of this article; to Arizona State
University’s Carrie Sperling and her colleagues for inviting me to present an early version at the 2012 Rocky Mountain
Regional Legal Writing Conference; and to a collection of “good readers” for their thoughtful responses: Linda Edwards, Bryn
Esplin, Rebecca Scharf, Kathy Stanchi, and the LC&R peer reviewers. Deepest thanks to LC&R’s unparalleled team of editors,
Ian Gallacher, Jessica Clark, Sue Painter-Thorne, Joan Magat, and Ruth Anne Robbins.
1 Daniel Kahneman & Gary Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure to Disagree, 64 Am. Psychol. 515, 525 (2009).
Balancing this statement, the authors also conclude that “a psychology of professional judgment that neglects predictable
errors [of intuition] cannot be adequate.” Id. 
seeking to persuade them and the judges themselves may effectively apply
lessons suggested by studies of intuitive problem solving.2
An example of the kind of problem judges must solve is the legal
question that lacks good precedent because cultural, social, or techno-
logical change has rendered the old rules a poor fit. In United States v.
Jones,3 the Supreme Court was presented with such a problem, created by
technological advances that have made it cheap and easy to carry out
long-term police surveillance of criminal suspects. In the days before tech-
nology made it possible to remotely monitor the movements of suspected
criminals, extended periods of surveillance were rare.4 As remote moni-
toring via Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices became more
common, so did the legal question of when such monitoring becomes an
unconstitutional search. In Jones, the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether a Fourth Amendment violation had taken place when a GPS
device was attached to a car and the car’s movements were subsequently
tracked for almost a month.5
The Jones challenge to the warrantless “search” constituted a problem-
solving situation because the prior precedents involved either a physical
trespass onto the defendant’s property or a more-personal intrusion into
the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Faced with the one-time
installation of a GPS monitor followed by weeks of constant surveillance,
the Supreme Court had to choose between applying the “trespass” rule,
which did not appear to cover the month-long monitoring, and reinter-
preting the “reasonable expectation” rule, which prior cases had said did
not encompass surveillance on public streets such as those on which
Jones’s car had traveled.6 Because Jones was in possession of the Jeep
registered to his wife, it was possible for the Court to find that the
government had physically trespassed without a warrant onto the
defendant’s property when agents installed the device on the under-
carriage of the car.7 Justice Scalia chose that route, and four other justices
agreed that in Jones itself, the trespass rule was enough to decide the
2 “Intuitive problem solving” is the term I will use for what the researchers refer to as the naturalistic decisionmaking
approach or the recognition-primed decision model. Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions 4–6, 15–30
(1998). Thank you to Chris Wren for recommending Sources of Power to those interested in legal persuasion. 
3 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (majority).
4 Although we take for granted that it is the law that protects our privacy from unwarranted government intrusion, “[i]n the
pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional
surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” Id. at 963 (Alito, J.,
concurring). 
5 Id. at 947–48 (majority).
6 Id. at 949–51.
7 Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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outcome.8 As the concurring opinions pointed out, however, the majority
provided no answer to what would happen in a case where no physical
trespass was necessary to install the monitoring device, but consistent and
long-term monitoring nonetheless took place—a growing possibility given
new technologies.9
The application of judicial intuition could help solve this problem, and
others like it, by bringing to mind a series of potential answers that are
“good enough” for testing. Whether prompted by lawyers seeking to
persuade them or by the judges themselves, intuitive problem solving
begins with cues pointing to similarities. As detailed in section III,
intuition —the recognition of potentially parallel patterns and paths–may
be triggered by factual analogies as well as by the use of metaphor and
perspective. In Jones, a lawyer might have suggested a factual analogy to
the unceasing observation that would occur if undercover police officers
were stationed in every public space and workplace and on every road and
street corner.10 Recognition of an alternative pattern might be prompted
by a factual analogy to the use of fixed video cameras to detect traffic
violations on highways and at major intersections. Cuing of another
pattern might be invited by the metaphor of one-way glass through which
those in authority observe the behavior of prisoners or the subjects of
psychological experiments. How a judge views the omnipresent moni-
toring of individuals by government agents could be shifted by raising
distinct philosophical and cultural perspectives (crime requires vigilance,
freedom requires restraint). In intuitive problem solving, these cues and
prompts provide the opening. Once a judge’s intuition triggers recognition
of the potential parallels, the alternatives are tested by imagining and eval-
uating how they would play out over time. 
As an example of the kind of problem that is not easily solved by
available interpretations and precedents, the Jones decision illustrates the
value of judicial intuition in suggesting patterns and paths for exploration.
Intuitive problem solving is different from conventional legal argument
because it does not rely in the first instance on deduction from rules or
analogies to precedent. Instead, it begins in cues prompting intuitive
recognition of similarities, followed by testing and evaluation, which may
8 Justice Scalia’s reasoning was that “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. at 949 (majority). 
9 Justices Sotomayor and Alito wrote separate concurrences criticizing the majority opinion for failing to address the
changing circumstances that have made physical intrusion unnecessary for many kinds of surveillance. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring); id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
10 This analogy is based on a hypothetical advanced in Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 101, 104 (2008).
Rubenfeld points out that existing Fourth Amendment doctrine would find no constitutional violations in this scenario. 
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or may not include the more-traditional argument structures. Intuition is
the invitation to the dance, not the full ballet.
The argument for applying judicial intuition appears to run counter to
recent findings of one branch of cognitive research and relies instead on a
branch of decisionmaking research that has been mostly neglected by legal
scholars.11 The latter researchers define intuition as “nothing more and
nothing less than recognition” of a pattern or path stored in the deci-
sionmaker’s memory.12 In this sense, intuition can pull up an instant
snapshot of a perception or experience already present in our minds, and
so it is easy to see why intuition may lead our judgments astray. But in
exactly the same sense, intuition can provide the wide-angle or telephoto
lens essential for the very different process of problem solving, a process in
which these lenses can be used to reveal unusual angles and unseen
corners. 
To support the argument that lawyers and judges should learn from
both, I will reconcile claims from the heuristics-and-biases branch of
cognitive psychology (the branch that demonstrated that intuitive mental
shortcuts, or heuristics, often lead to mistakes and cognitive biases) with
findings from studies of intuitive problem solving (the branch that studies
intuition as the primary method used by real-world experts to identify
options for testing). Echoing the findings of other heuristics-and-biases
research, studies involving trial judges indicate that intuition regularly
misleads them when it comes to making judgments.13 When judges use
11 The first branch, heuristics-and-biases research, concentrates on the “overconfident and biased impressions” that grow
out of intuition; the second branch, naturalistic decisionmaking, on the expertise that may lead to “true intuitive skill.”
Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 515. Heuristics and biases are two sides of the same coin: the heuristic is an experience-
based rule of thumb that often works well, but can also lead to systematic errors or cognitive biases.
This article draws on the work of Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein as the leading representatives of these approaches.
Kahneman, a psychologist, won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002; he and his long-time partner, Amos Tversky,
conducted the first study in the field now known as heuristics and biases in 1969. The best-selling success of Kahneman’s
Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), focusing on the “biases of intuition,” followed by only a few years the best-selling success of
Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink: The Power Of Thinking Without Thinking (2005) (focusing on the wonders of intuition).
Kahneman, though expressing admiration for Gladwell, said in a radio interview during his book tour that “Malcolm
Gladwell definitely created in the public arenas the impression that intuition is magical . . . . That belief is false.” Interview by
Charlie Rose with Daniel Kahneman, (Feb. 28, 2012) (available at http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/12185).
Since 1985, Klein, an experimental psychologist, has studied and written about the field of naturalistic decisionmaking,
examining how intuition triggers good decisionmaking in situations such as firefighting, nursing, and military leadership. See
Klein, Sources of Power, supra n. 2, at 1–2; Gary Klein, Streetlights and Shadows: Searching for the Keys to Adaptive Decision
Making (2009). 
In a September 2009 article, Kahneman and Klein reported that after several years of collaboration, they had reached a
“coherent view of expert intuition,” agreeing on the circumstances that would allow intuition to yield good decisionmaking.
Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 524. 
12 Herbert A. Simon, What is an “Explanation” of Behavior?, 3 Psychol. Sci. 150, 155 (1992).
13 See e.g. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
Cornell L. Rev. 1, 29–43 (2007) (suggesting an “intuition-override” model of judging in which judges make intuitive decisions
that sometimes are overridden by deliberation) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris
Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1227 (2006) (reporting results of an
experiment with specialist-court judges); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
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heuristics based on past experience (these include mental shortcuts such
as stereotypes, prototypes, scripts, and schema) to make inferences from
what they observe or perceive and then follow those inferences to make
judgments about character or to predict the future, intuition appears to
close minds, excluding some relevant facts to hasten a “snapshot”
judgment.
In comparison, the intuitive problem-solving branch of research has
not before been applied to the psychology of judging.14 Based on studies of
experts making decisions in the field, that body of work suggests that
when it comes to solving problems, intuition opens minds. It prompts
decisionmakers to recognize seemingly appropriate patterns and paths as
well as possible parallels or alternatives. Rather than misleading expert
problem solvers, intuition invites them to enter into a process that can
lead to workable and effective decisions.15
The first two sections of the article explore these branches of
cognitive research as well as current thinking about judicial decision-
making. The third section analyzes the use of intuitive problem-solving
methods in briefs and opinions, and the conclusion suggests that judges,
lawyers, and other students of legal persuasion should apply these insights
to their own problem-solving situations.16
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251 (2005) (concluding that judges,
like juries, are generally unable to disregard the influence of relevant, yet inadmissible, evidence); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 777 (2001) (concluding that even though judges
appeared to be less susceptible than non-judges to two cognitive illusions, framing effects and representativeness, judicial
decisionmaking was significantly affected by each of five illusions tested).
14 As Gary Klein explains, his studies go “against the general stream of research” in cognitive psychology: 
As long as the rational and analytical processes were defined as the ideal for reasoning, . . . [t]he job of researchers
[was] to understand why people might generate the wrong values or inconsistent values. . . . Rather than helping to tie
off loose ends, the sources of power I describe in this book are busily proliferating them.
Klein, Sources of Power, supra n. 2, at 286.
15 Id.
16 Complex problem solving of the kind required in United States v. Jones likely occurs in both trial courts and appellate
courts. Although trial court judges depend more obviously on their judgments about credibility, probability, and the future,
they also are the first in line to be asked to solve problems of legal interpretation and application. Similarly, though appellate
judges may more often be called upon to solve problems of legal interpretation, they make the same kinds of “eyeball”
judgments on many discrete issues along the way. 
Though most judges and decisionmaking researchers characterize judicial decisionmaking as complex, two psychol-
ogists concluded in a 1984 article that “legal decisions are actually very simple, in the sense that very few factors are typically
taken into account, and that the few factors which are taken into account are generally not those which the decisionmakers
claim they are responsive to.” Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, The Mythology of Legal Decision Making, 7 Intl. J. L. &
Psych. 5, 6–7 (1984) (based on statistical analyses of arrest decisions, bail recommendations and decisions, sentencing
recommendations and decisions, and personal-injury settlement recommendations). Elsewhere, the same authors concluded
that decisionmakers within the criminal justice system “often report that they follow decision policies that either are so global
as to be meaningless . . . or, when specific enough, describe policies that are inconsistent with their actual decision strategies.”
Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, Criticisms of the Criminal Justice System: A Decision Making Analysis, 3 Behav. Sci.
& L. 177, 190 (1985).
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I. Schools of Thought about Thinking
In this article, I will refer to the full range of choices that judges make
as decisionmaking. Within that category, I will refer to the up-or-down,
yes-or-no votes that judges cast on one-dimensional questions as
judgments and to the process of resolving more-complex questions by
choosing a workable and effective option as problem solving.17 Simply put,
the distinction between judgments and problem solving is the difference
between making predictions based on perceptions (judgments) and
choosing among options to achieve particular goals (problem solving).
Judgments may be right or wrong (as noted earlier, they call for a “yes” or
“no” answer) while problem solving likely encompasses several workable
answers. 
So, for example, judges may be asked to (1) make judgments about
witness credibility, future criminality, or the probability of one thing
having caused another; or they may be asked to (2) solve problems by
identifying a workable approach to new or previously unrecognized or
unaddressed problems or by choosing the better alternative among a
range of options.18 No matter what kind of decision a judge is making,
judicial choices often occur within a context of “multiple, fallible,
incomplete, and sometimes conflicting cues.”19
Although choosing the best among a group of options is only one of
the kinds of problems that judges solve, the study of decisionmaking has
assumed that most decisions involve exactly and only that: choosing the
better alternative through a process that carefully lays out, weighs, and
17 According to Reid Hastie, behavioral researchers differentiate between “judgment” and “decisionmaking”; because the
term “decisionmaking” has been used in the all-encompassing sense in much of the legal literature, I will use it that way in
this article and distinguish between judgment and problem solving, intending to separate out judgments based on perception
from choices based on a more complex process. 
Hastie makes the distinction as follows:
Research on judgment has been inspired by analogies between perception and prediction. For judgment
researchers, the central empirical questions concern the processes by which as-yet-obscure events, outcomes, and
consequences could be inferred (or, speaking metaphorically, “perceived”): How do people integrate multiple, fallible,
incomplete, and sometimes conflicting cues to infer what is happening in the external world? . . . The primary
standards for the quality of judgment are based on accuracy [of ] the correspondence between a judgment, and the
criterion condition that was the target of the judgment.
On the other hand, decisionmaking research 
was inspired by theories concerned with decision making that were originally developed by philosophers, mathe-
maticians, and economists. These theorists were most interested in understanding preferential choice and action: How
do people choose what action to take to achieve labile, sometimes conflicting goals in an uncertain world? These
models are often expressed axiomatically and algebraically, in the tradition established for measurement theories in
physics and economics. 
Reid Hastie, Problems for Judgment and Decision Making, 52 Annual Rev. Psychol. 653, 657 (2001).
18 It is possible to view judgments of the first type as calling for decisions based primarily on perceptions about facts and
problem solving of the second type as encompassing decisions based primarily on legal questions. This distinction is less
helpful in complex decisions that mix factual and legal uncertainties.
19 Hastie, supra n. 17, at 657.
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compares the pluses and minuses of each option in advance.20 When
making such decisions, the rational decisionmaker is assumed to evaluate
each alternative course of action or choice by balancing its ability to meet
his or her desired goals with the probabilities that those goals would occur.
This decisionmaking framework, the rational-choice model, has been
found to be incomplete, misleading, or wrong.21
But this does not mean that human decisionmaking is without reason.
Even when decisionmakers appear biased or irrational, they often are
using the abilities and resources most readily available to them to solve
some problem or achieve some goal. As already indicated, the broad
findings from experiments in cognitive psychology indicate that judges are
just as prone to making mistakes as other individuals when they are
making judgments. They apply biases in the same way, and their expe-
rience and expertise adds little to the accuracy of their judgments. On the
other hand, in deciding among two or more alternatives or solving other
kinds of unprecedented problems, judges may more accurately be viewed
as experts in at least some circumstances.
This section introduces two schools of thought about decisionmaking:
the heuristics-and-biases approach (Daniel Kahneman) and the intuitive
problem-solving approach (Gary Klein). The first views intuition as more
often leading to mistakes and overconfidence, while the second views
intuition as essential to recognizing alternatives for solving a problem.
A. Heuristics and biases: intuition is an untrustworthy shortcut
For convenience, heuristics-and-biases researchers divide our
thinking and reasoning processes into intuitive and analytical categories:
System 1 (thinking “fast” or intuitively) and System 2 (thinking “slow” or
analytically). In a typical shorthand description, System 1 “is rapid,
intuitive, emotional, and prone to bias,” while System 2 “is more deliberate,
more reflective, more dispassionate, and (it is said) more accurate.”22
Although the so-called “dual-process” model of information gathering and
20 Id. at 657–58.
21 Id.
22 Dan Kahan, What Is Motivated Reasoning and How Does It Work, Science and Religion Today, http://www.scienceandreli-
giontoday.com/2011/05/04/what-is-motivated-reasoning-and-how-does-it-work/ (May 4, 2011). Judge Posner vividly
describes the two types of thinking: 
The first is the domain of hunches, snap judgments, emotional reactions, and first impressions—in short, instant
responses to sensations. Obviously there is a cognitive process involved . . . . But there is no conscious thought, because
there is no time for it. The second type of thinking is the domain of logic, deliberation, reasoned discussion, and
scientific method. Here thinking is conscious. . . . Articulate thinking is the model of rationality, while intuitive thinking
is often seen as primitive, “emotional” in a derogatory sense . . . .
Richard A. Posner, Blinkered, The New Republic 27 (Jan. 24, 2005) (reviewing Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of
Thinking Without Thinking (2004)). 
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information processing has been around for some time,23 much of the
recent visibility for System 1 and System 2 thinking can be attributed to
Daniel Kahneman and his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow.24
Kahneman’s research began as an attempt to find out how and why
intuition often leads us astray, and he has spent much of his career
conducting experiments in which intuitive judgments are almost always
found to be inaccurate. As a young lieutenant in the Israeli Defense Forces
in 1955, Kahneman was asked to set up an interview system for recruits.25
Before he set up a new system, a personal interview had served as the basis
for an assessment of fitness for combat and for matching the personality of
the recruit to the appropriate branch of the armed forces. Evaluations of
the interview system found it was “almost useless” in predicting how
recruits would perform in service. Kahneman concluded that the system
failed because it allowed the interviewers to ask interesting questions
when they instead should have been evaluating relevant personality traits
based on past performance.26
Among the best known of Kahneman’s experiments is the “Linda
problem,” designed to show how predispositions affect judgment and
trump logic (or at least overcome people’s knowledge of statistical proba-
bilities).27 In the Linda problem, Kahneman posits that “Linda is thirty-one
years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy.
As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and
social justice, and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.”28 The
researchers ask a combination of questions, concluding with: 
Which alternative is more probable?
Linda is a bank teller.
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
A majority of those answering usually choose the second option, an
answer contrary to the logic that tells you that the group of bank tellers
must be larger than the group of people who are not only bank tellers but
23 The dual-process model described information as being processed along a continuum from (at the heuristic end)
effortless perception of information using rules of thumb or stereotypes to (at the systematic end) careful study of the infor-
mation. 
24 Kahneman, supra n. 11. 
25 Id. at 229–32.
26 Id. Kahneman was influenced in this early study by Paul Meehl’s 1954 monograph that compared the accuracy of forecasts
made by people with those made by statistical models. Paul E. Meehl, Clinical vs. Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical
Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954). 
27 Kahneman, supra n. 11, at 156–59. These experiments were conducted with Kahneman’s long-time collaborator, Amos
Tversky. See id. at 4–10. 
28 Id. at 156.
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also feminists. Kahneman explains the wrong answers as reflecting the
respondents’ judgments of “representativeness”; that is, the most coherent
and plausible explanation is that a person with those personality attributes
most likely would be a feminist, and so if she was a bank teller, she had to
be a feminist too.29
Though much of the book highlights the inaccurate judgments that
result from fast (or intuitive) thinking, fast thinking often is not only good,
but also essential to our lives. Knowing that the green light means go
without having to think about it means that we can safely walk across the
street within the seconds allowed by the timed traffic signal. System 1
routinely guides our thoughts and actions, and we continue to follow
System 1 because it often serves us well. On the other hand, System 1 is
the source of “implicit bias,” the result of unconscious mental processes
that affect perception, impressions, and judgment because of implicit
memories, perceptions, attitudes, and stereotypes.30
One of the characteristics that distinguishes System 1 from its coun-
terpart is its relationship to affect or emotion: it “represents events in the
form of concrete exemplars and schemas inductively derived from
emotionally significant past experiences.” Whether System 1 or System 2
has the greater influence in a particular circumstance depends both on the
characteristics of the situation and the emotions affected: when the situ-
ations are the same, “the greater the emotional involvement, the greater
the shift in the balance of influence from the rational to the experiential
system.”31 Not only does System 1’s “reliance on affect and emotion [make
it] a quicker, easier, and more efficient way to navigate in a complex,
uncertain, and sometimes dangerous environment,” failing to listen to
System 1 can lead decisions astray when they include an emotional
component.32
On the other hand, slow thinking may be essential for complex
decisions. From the perspective of this school of thought, application of
System 2 thinking almost always improves decisionmaking.33 The quick
impressions created by System 1 will control our judgments and decisions
unless they are modified or overridden by the deliberate operations of
System 2. 
29 Id. at 158–59.
30 John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42
McGeorge L. Rev. 1, 2 (2010).
31 Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational Processing: When People Behave Against
Their Better Judgment, 66 J. of Personality & Soc. Psychol. 819, 819 (1994).
32 Paul Slovic, Affect, Reason, and Mere Hunches, 4 J. L. Econ. & Policy 192, 201–04 (2007).
33 Because this article focuses on the less-appreciated benefits of System 1, I will not detail the many virtues of System 2
thinking. 
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B. Intuitive problem solving: intuition unlocks solutions 
to problems
The second school of thought34 focuses on successful problem solving
prompted by expert intuition. While Kahneman has “spent much of his
career running experiments in which intuitive judgment was commonly
found to be flawed,” scientist and author Gary Klein has spent most of his
career studying expert decisionmaking and “thinking about ways to
promote reliance on expert intuition.”35 The kind of “intuition” Klein
advocates is not the so-called gut reaction that leads to instant knowledge
that someone is telling the truth or lying, but the flash of recognition that
comes from a cue alerting the problem solver to an analogous pattern,
allowing the expert to draw on past or known experiences to come up with
parallel patterns or paths. Klein’s field studies began because he was
impressed with the ability of firefighting commanders to make quick and
accurate decisions under conditions of stress and uncertainty. Gathering
information by extracting stories from a range of experts, Klein found that
in real-life complex situations, experts rely on expert intuition to solve
problems. It is not so much that their intuitions are correct, but that
intuition is how they identify workable options to test.36
A recent prototype of this kind of expert intuition is well known:
On January 15, 2009, at 3:25 p.m., US Airways Flight 1529, an
Airbus 320, took off from LaGuardia Airport in New York on its way to
Charlotte, North Carolina. Two minutes after the takeoff, the airplane hit
a flock of Canada geese and lost thrust in both of its engines. The
captain, Chesley B. “Sully” Sullenberger III, and the first officer, Jeffrey
Skiles, safely landed the airplane in the Hudson River at 3:31 p.m. All 150
passengers plus the five crew members were rescued.37
By the time of this apparently unprecedented landing,38 Captain
Sullenberger had been flying airplanes for almost 40 years. Many
attributed the successful landing not only to his years of experience, but
also to the breadth and depth of his knowledge of similar situations. He
34 See Klein, Sources of Power, supra n. 2, at 1–2; Klein, Streetlights and Shadows, supra n. 11.
35 Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 515. In a 1992 article, cognitive psychologist James Shanteau pointed out that while
“judgment and decision research has shown that experts make flawed decisions due, in part, to the biasing effects of judg-
mental heuristics,” cognitive science research “views experts as competent and different from novices in nearly every aspect
of cognitive functioning.” James Shanteau, Competence in Experts: The Role of Task Characteristics, 53 Organizational
Behavior & Human Decision Processes 252, 252 (1992).
36 Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 516.
37 Klein, Streetlights and Shadows, supra n. 11, at 91–92.
38 See Welcome Aboard; Fear of Flying, The Economist (Sept. 7, 2006) (available at www.economist.com/node/7884654) (“In
the event of a landing on water, an unprecedented miracle will have occurred, because in the history of aviation the number
of wide-bodied aircraft that have made successful landings on water is zero.”).
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had been an Air Force fighter pilot and a glider pilot as well as a
commercial airline pilot; he had participated in many airline crash investi-
gations. In addition to studying the causes of airplane crashes,
Sullenberger was involved in developing and teaching techniques for
managing airplane emergencies.39
Sullenberger’s decisionmaking followed the process described in what
Klein calls the recognition-primed, naturalistic, or intuitive decision-
making model. He first considered the option of returning to LaGuardia,
but quickly realized that the airplane would not make it that far; he then
considered the option of finding another airport, but almost immediately
decided that was too far as well. So he settled on the third option, landing
in the Hudson River. Sullenberger 
considered three courses of action, one at a time, starting with the most
typical and ending with the most desperate. . . . [But] [h]e didn’t set up
the kind of decision matrix [we still think of as typical], . . . listing these
three options and contrasting them on common evaluation dimensions
such as shortest distance, best runways, least inconvenience to
passengers who might need to re-book their flights. Sullenberger was
satisficing, looking for the first option that would work.40
The intuitive decisionmaking model blends two processes: (1) how
decisionmakers “size up” a situation and thus recognize a possibly
workable course of action and (2) how they evaluate the course of action
by simulating or imagining its results.41 So, when a firefighting
commander recognizes that the crew is facing a particular kind of fire, the
commander also understands or recognizes (1) “what types of goals make
sense”; (2) “which cues are important” (so the decisionmaker is not over-
loaded with irrelevant information); (3) “what to expect next”; (4) what are
“the typical ways of responding”; and (5) which course of action is most
likely to succeed.42
39 Stephany Schings & Clif Boutelle, The Difference Between a Miracle and a Tragedy: Pilot’s I-O Training May Have Helped
Lead to Safe Landing on the Hudson, Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Inc. (available at
http://www.siop.org/Media/News/crash.aspx) (accessed August 9, 2012).
40 Klein, Streetlights and Shadows, supra n. 11, at 91–92. “Satisficing,” a combination of “satisfy” and “suffice,” means making
a “good enough” choice. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. Econ. 99 (1955). The National
Transportation Safety Board concluded that one of the factors contributing to the survivability of the accident was the
“decision-making of the flight crewmembers . . . during the accident sequence.” National Transportation Safety Board, Loss of
Thrust in Both Engines After Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson River, US Airways Flight
1549, Airbus A320-214, N106US, Weehawken, New Jersey, Jan. 15, 2009, Aircraft Accident Report, NTSB/AAR-10-03 (2010)
(available at http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2010/aar1003.pdf). 
41 Klein, Sources of Power, supra n. 2, at 24.
42 Id.
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Klein points out that this process differs from the rational-choice
model of decisionmaking (the decisionmaker lines up the pluses and
minuses of each option and decides by weighing them) in several ways:
first, the decisionmaker focuses on assessing a situation and finding
familiar features, rather than on comparing options. The decisionmaker
quickly evaluates possible courses of action by imagining how they would
be carried out rather than going through a more formal comparison.
Finally, the decisionmaker looks for the first workable option, rather than
the best. Because the decisionmaker often finds the first option to be
workable, the decisionmaker usually generates and evaluates alternatives
one at a time. By imagining the first workable option being carried out, the
expert can spot and fix weaknesses.43
Although two schools of thought remain, Kahneman and Klein found
in a collaborative project that they agreed about some basics of the
thinking process, including the ways in which expert intuition may be
developed.44 For the purposes of this article, more important than their
agreement on the basics is their continuing emphasis on the distinctive
roles played by System 1 and System 2 thinking. In the Klein model of
intuitive problem solving, experts engage in both an intuitive process “that
brings promising solutions to mind and a deliberate activity in which the .
. . solution is mentally simulated.”45 In the Kahneman model, System 2 is
involved in careful reasoning and decisionmaking as well as in continuous
monitoring. “When there are cues that an intuitive judgment could be
wrong, System 2 can impose a different strategy.”46 Intuition opens minds
for further thinking in the Klein approach, but intuition exists to be
corrected in the Kahneman model.
II. Schools of Thought about Judicial Decisionmaking
The conclusion that judges are like the rest of us47 seems to explain
the results of experiments in which judges are asked to make judgments
about credibility, risk, or probability. But judges may be different, and
more expert in their use of intuition, when they are asked to solve
43 Id. at 30. 
44 Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 515.
45 Id. at 519.
46 Id.
47 For a discussion of whether there is something unique
about judges’ decisionmaking, see Frederick Schauer, Is
There a Psychology of Judging?, in The Psychology of Judicial
Decision Making 103 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds.,
2010). “[T]he existing research tends to support the view
that a judge’s attributes as a human being reveal more about
the psychology of judging than does anything a judge might
have learned in law school, acquired in the practice of law,
or internalized by virtue of serving in the judicial role.” Id. at
103–04; see also Dan Simon, In Praise of Pedantic
Eclecticism: Pitfalls and Opportunities in the Psychology of
Judging, in The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making 131
(responding to Schauer). 
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problems in the courtroom. Whenever decisionmakers make complex
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, it seems likely that both
intuitive (System 1) and analytical (System 2) thinking will come into play,
whether in interaction, in tandem, in sequence, or in interference. Such
meshing, melding, or sequencing of fast and slow thinking finds support
in studies of legal reasoning as well as in more-general decisionmaking
research.48
A. Legal decisionmaking as “sensemaking”49
If a single theme can be drawn from current research and theories of
how judges (and juries) make decisions, whether those decisions are based
upon trial evidence or appellate records, it is that the decisionmaker
engages in “sensemaking” or in constructing plausible stories or
frameworks that make sense of what they have been told.50 These theories
describe an unconscious process in which the decisionmaker’s implicit
knowledge and background experience intuitively affect his or her
perceptions and impressions, and those in turn add up to an increasingly
coherent and cohesive whole. 
For example, the psychological model of coherence-based reasoning51
describes judicial decisionmaking as beginning in conflict but ending in
closure. The decisionmaker’s understanding moves through a reasoning
process that “genuinely manifests a transformation of the way the dispute
is represented in the judge’s mind. During the course of deciding a hard
case, the judge’s mental representation of the dispute evolves naturally
towards a state of coherence.”52 At the beginning of the process, some
48 Studies of the influence of politics and ideology on judicial behavior are beyond the scope of this article. For a helpful
discussion of how such studies might interact with psychological inquiry, see Lawrence Baum, Motivation and Judicial
Behavior: Expanding the Scope of Inquiry, in The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making, supra n. 47, at 3–25. For a discussion
of the studies themselves, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging 111–55
(2010).
49 The concept of “sensemaking,” which appears similar to the theories reported in this section, has been used in the organ-
ization sciences. See e.g. Karl E. Weick, Making Sense of the Organization (2001); Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in
Organizations (1995). Ryan Malphurs applied the concept to Supreme Court oral arguments in Ryan Malphurs, Making Sense
of “Bong Hits 4 Jesus”: A Study of Rhetorical Discursive Bias in Morse v. Fredrick, 7 J. ALWD 247 (2010). 
50 See e.g. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L.
Rev. 519 (1991) (suggesting that story construction is a central cognitive process when jurors are making decisions) [here-
inafter Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story
Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. of Personality & Soc. Psych. 189 (1992) (reporting on experiments that support the
story model); see also Kenworthey Bilz, We Don’t Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature, and the Narrative Model of Judging,
2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 429 (2010) (arguing that the narrative model should have inclusionary and exclusionary aspects).
51 Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 511 (2004). 
52 Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 Rutgers L.J. 1, 20 (1998); see also Dan Simon, In Praise
of Pedantic Eclecticism, supra n. 47, at 138–43; Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look through the Lens
of Cognitive Psychology, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 1097 (2002) (suggesting that judicial coherence results from basic cognitive
functions as well as from elements specific to the judicial role, including the need to make binary judgments and to decide).
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arguments seem to support one decision and other arguments support
another outcome. While deciding the case, the judge’s mental model of the
dispute moves toward coherence; the facts, the rules, and the propositions
involved are cognitively changed, that is, they undergo coherence shifts,
resulting in a tightly consistent justification for the final result.53 In other
words, decisionmakers are actively engaged in constructing mental
models of the situation, and their perceptions of the evidence change,
unconsciously, as they move through the situation. The reasoning process
moves in both directions: 
People . . . do not only infer a decision from the evidence, but also reason
backwards, from options to the evidence. . . . Information supporting the
favored interpretation is highlighted whereas the perceived importance
or reliability of information that speaks against this interpretation is
reduced.54
The research and theory gathered under the term “cultural cognition”
also support the overall perspective of judicial sensemaking sparked by
intuition or recognition of parallel patterns and paths.55 Cultural-
cognition theory suggests that rather than providing a self-conscious
motive for making decisions, the decisionmaker’s values are subcon-
sciously influencing cognition during the reasoning process. The
decisionmaker’s cultural outlook is not the source of his or her judgments,
but unconsciously influences how the decisionmaker perceives the facts.56
“Motivated cognition,” a related theory, refers to “the unconscious
tendency of individuals to fit their processing of information to
conclusions that suit some end or goal.”57 In the classic experiment,
53 As Simon describes the process,
A mental model of a decision task is deemed “coherent” when the decision-maker perceives the chosen alter-
native to be supported by strong considerations while the considerations that support the rejected alternative are weak.
Such is the case, for example, when the prosecution’s eyewitness is reliable, the forensic evidence is compelling, and the
defendant has a strong motive and a weak alibi. A mental model is considered “incoherent” when the decision-maker
perceives the considerations as providing equivocal support for both alternatives.
Simon, Black Box, supra n. 51, at 516.
54 Andreas Glöckner & Christoph Engel, Can We Trust Intuitive Jurors? Standards of Proof and the Probative Value of
Evidence in Coherence Based Reasoning 2, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn
2008/36
(Oct. 2008, rev’d Mar. 2010) (available at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/ 2008_36online.pdf).
55 For a general description, see The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, http://www.culturalcognition.net; Dan
M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 149 (2006); see also Dan M.
Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 729
(2010); Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 107 (2010) (applying cultural-cognition theory to
labor and employment decisions). 
56 Kahan & Braman, supra n. 55, at 149–50.
57 Kahan, What is Motivated Reasoning, supra n. 22.
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students from two colleges reviewed a film of a football game; students
from each school were more likely to view a referee’s call as correct when
it went in favor of their school. Researchers attributed what the students
“saw” to their emotional connection to their schools. Like coherence-
based reasoning and cultural cognition, motivated cognition is
unconscious: the decisionmaker does not have a conscious reason for
perceiving evidence in a particular way. Instead, the processor’s goal
“motivates the cognition in the sense that it directs mental operations—in
this case, sensory perceptions; in others, assessments of the weight and
credibility of empirical evidence, or performance of mathematical or
logical computation—that we expect to function independently of that
goal or end.”58
Juror research provides a compelling description as well as further
support for the “story model” of decisionmaking, one that is triggered by
an early intuitive recognition of an appropriate pattern or path.59 In the
story model, jurors impose a narrative framework on the information they
receive during trial. In addition to the evidence presented, jurors use their
knowledge of similar situations as well as expectations arising from how
they generally view the issues raised by the case.60 The evidence is incor-
porated into several plausible accounts or stories of what happened. The
story framework helps jurors understand the evidence and reach a
tentative decision. After hearing the possible verdicts in the case, the juror
matches the story with the most fitting verdict category.61
B. The Role of intuition in judging
Although others may distrust judicial intuition, judges acknowledge
and value its role. Early in the 20th century, Judge Joseph Hutcheson
famously described his decisionmaking process:
[A]fter canvassing all the available material at my command, and duly
cogitating upon it, [I] give my imagination play, and brooding over the
cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch—that intuitive flash of under-
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58 Id. 
59 Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra n. 50, at 520–33. Another assessment concluded that “jurors’ thinking can
be accounted for both by the story model and dual-process model.” Ryan J. Winter & Edith Greene, Juror Decision-Making, in
Handbook of Applied Cognition 739, 757 (2d ed. 2007). 
60 Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra n. 50, at 521–29.
61 Id. at 529–33. A key distinction of the story model is the finding that jurors construct an intermediary structure that
becomes the basis for the decision. Id.
62 Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 Cornell L. Q. 274,
278 (1929).
standing which makes the jump-spark connection between question and
decision . . . .62
Richard Weisberg characterized Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s writing
about the judicial process as illustrating his recognition that “[j]udgment
requires refined intuition as well as cold logic. It requires an instinctive
awareness of the correct outcome on the facts, an outcome that is ‘correct’
not solely from the judge’s personal perspective.”63 For Justice Cardozo,
“flashes of insight” came from “experience usually extensive and often
profound.”64 As Dan Simon described it, Justice Cardozo’s view was that
“[m]aking decisions is akin to groping in the dark, an exercise of testing
and retesting hypotheses, a process informed by ‘a hint, an illustration, a
suggestion.’”65
Justice William Brennan gave Justice Cardozo credit for “having 
awakened America to the human reality of the judicial process.” 
From him we learned that judging could not properly be characterized as
simply the application of pure reason to legal problems, nor, at the other
extreme, as the application of the personal will or passion of the judge.
Cardozo drew our attention to the interplay of forces, rational and
emotional, conscious and unconscious, by which no judge could remain
unaffected.66
In How Judges Think, Judge Richard Posner marshals support for his
view that most judges are pragmatists67 (motivated by consequences) by
quoting, among others, Justice Anthony Kennedy:
You know, all of us have an instinctive judgment that we make. You meet
a person, you say, “I trust this person. I don’t trust this person. I find her
interesting. I don’t find him interesting.” Whatever. You make these quick
judgments. That’s the way you get through life. And judges do the same
thing. And I suppose there’s nothing wrong with that if it’s just a
beginning point.68
63 Richard H. Weisberg, Law, Literature and Cardozo’s Judicial Poetics, 1 Cardozo L. Rev. 283, 307 (1979).
64 Id. at 308 (quoting Address by Benjamin N. Cardozo, N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n. (Jan. 22, 1932), reprinted in Selected Writings of
Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 27 n. 4 (3d ed. 1947) [hereinafter Selected Writings]). 
65 Dan Simon, The Double-Consciousness of Judging: The Problematic Legacy of Cardozo, 79 Or. L. Rev. 101, 111–12 (2000)
(quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, in Selected Writings, supra n. 64, at 253; Benjamin N.
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in Selected Writings, supra n. 64, at 175–76, 183; and Benjamin N. Cardozo, The
Growth of the Law, in Selected Writings, supra n. 64, at 214). 
66 William J. Brennan Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3 (1988) (address delivered at the
Ass’n of the B. of the City of N.Y. on Sept. 17, 1987). 
67 Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 256–63 (2008). 
68 Anthony Kennedy Interview, Academy of Achievement: A Museum of Living History (Oct. 22, 2006) (quoted in Posner,
How Judges Think, supra n. 67, at 257). 
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At the trial-court level as well, judges acknowledge that they apply
their intuition, recognizing familiar patterns based on experience. For
example, in United States v. Shonubi,69 the sentencing judge was told by a
higher court to reestimate the amount of cocaine smuggled into the
country by the defendant and to resentence him.70 After much expert
testimony and time, the judge estimated a somewhat smaller amount, but
made no change in the sentence.71 In a 61-page opinion describing his
decisionmaking process, the judge wrote that “[i]t should come as no
surprise that in addition to rational analysis, the forensic factfinder
depends upon assumptions and methods of thinking that may introduce
biases and errors.”72 Among these, the judge said, were inferences based on
prior information and training; “[a] trial judge’s ‘hunch’ is generally based
on the evidence and experience, albeit with the inferential chain
unstated.”73
Judicial intuition is viewed less favorably in one of the best-known
models of judicial decisionmaking, the intuition-override model. This
model is based on the blend of intuitive and analytical thinking suggested
by the heuristics-and-biases researchers.74 Rather than view intuition as
key to discovery or recognition of potential similarities, an essential step
toward testing of workable options for solving problems, the intuition-
override model assumes that judges usually reach a conclusion by applying
their intuition, but holds out hope that judges will sometimes be able to
override that intuitive judgment with slower, more deliberative thinking. 75
As Kahneman and his coauthor had described the process earlier, System
1 quickly proposes intuitive answers as problems come up, and System 2
monitors their quality so that it may enforce, correct, or override the
intuitive response.76
Backing up the intuition-override model with the results of their
research involving trial-court judges, Professors Guthrie, Wistrich, and
Rachlinski concluded that not only when confronted with ordinary,
nonlegal tasks, but also when faced with some specific categories of
problems they are likely to encounter on the bench, judges are inclined to
make inaccurate intuitive judgments, and they are vulnerable to
distractors like absurd settlement demands and vivid facts.77 Specifically,
69 895 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
70 Id. at 467–68.
71 Id. at 464.
72 Id. at 464–65.
73 Id. at 482–83.
74 See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of
Heuristic Judgment, in Heuristics of Intuitive Judgment (T.
Gilovich, D. Griffin & D. Kahneman eds., 2002). 
75 Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra n. 13, at
27–29.
76 Kahneman & Frederick, supra n. 74. 
77 Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra n. 13, at
27–28.
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they found that “judges who employed intuitive thinking allowed an
irrelevant settlement demand to influence their damage awards, allowed
an impressionistic assessment of statistical evidence to shape their liability
determinations, and allowed outcome information to influence their
assessments of the ex ante predictability of appellate courts.”78 Among the
negative effects of intuition, they also noted that it might be the path “by
which undesirable influences, like the race, gender, or attractiveness of
parties” affected judicial choices.79 Finally, the authors asserted that
judicial intuition would remain unreliable because “judges are unlikely to
obtain accurate and reliable feedback on most of the judgments they
make.”80
My argument here is not that the findings reported in Blinking on the
Bench are incorrect. Instead, it is that the results of these experiments add
little to the discussion of the use of intuition in judicial problem solving;
for the most part, the reported experiments tested judgments based on
perceptions, rather than the problem-solving process.81 As a result,
though they provide helpful reminders about the shortcomings of
intuition in making predictions about the future or assessments of proba-
bility, the findings shed little light on the role of intuition in problem
solving.
C. Viewing judges as experts in problem solving
Firefighting commanders and jet pilots make split-second decisions in
life-threatening circumstances. Split-second timing is not typical of the
courtroom, but both trial and appellate judges make high-stakes choices
with incomplete, uncertain, or conflicting information. The problems
these judges face seem at first glance analogous to the problems
confronting the experts in Klein’s studies: the problems are often poorly
defined; they require the judge to use “domain-specific” knowledge (here,
specialized legal knowledge); they carry real, and serious, consequences;
and the judges are required to decide under significant “real-time”
pressures and without full information.82
To determine the kinds of problems that might be subject to intuitive
expertise by judges, let’s start with what Kahneman and Klein agree upon
as a “coherent view of expert intuition.”83 First, they acknowledge that
“intuitive judgments can arise from genuine skill . . . but that they can also
arise from inappropriate application of . . . heuristic [or shortcut]
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78 Id. at 31. 
79 Id.
80 Id. at 32.
81 The differences are discussed in section III, infra. 
82 Klein, Sources of Power, supra n. 2, at 4. 
83 Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 524.
processes.” They agree as well that a mark of intuition in both skilled and
unskilled judges is that they “are often unaware of the cues that guide
them.” Not surprisingly then, confidence is an unreliable indicator of the
validity of intuitive judgments and choices. But if a decisionmaking “envi-
ronment provides valid cues and good feedback,” they also agree that “skill
and expert intuition will eventually develop in individuals of sufficient
talent.” And even some uncertain environments provide valid cues; for
example, making the best moves in situations like poker and warfare has
been found to reliably increase success.84
Although the heuristics-and-biases branch of cognitive research has
shown that even experts are led astray by intuition, other researchers have
concluded that many “experts within their domains are skilled, competent,
and think in qualitatively different ways than novices.”85 Some of the
earliest research in the field of expert intuition studied how master chess
players decide which pieces to move and where to move them on a
chessboard.86 The researchers found that master players were able to size
up a complex position and quickly, or intuitively, identify the best moves.
These expert chess players had 50,000 to 100,000 recognizable patterns in
their heads, allowing them to intuitively pluck the better responsive move
from their repertoire.87
The chess-master studies prompted the definition of intuition that
Klein later adopted: 
The situation has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to
information stored in memory, and the information provides the answer.
Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition [of a parallel
pattern or path stored in memory].88
Intuitive judgments or choices “come to mind on their own, without
explicit awareness of the evoking cues and . . . without an explicit eval-
uation of the validity of these cues.”89 As a result, all intuitive judgments
appear to belong to System 1: “They are automatic, arise effortlessly, and
often come to mind without immediate justification.”90
But intuitive judgments are of two different classes. Some intuitive
choices “arise from experience and manifest skill,”91 while less-accurate
intuitions, although they “also arise from the operations of memory,” are
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84 Id.
85 Shanteau, Competence in Experts, supra n. 35, at 5.
86 Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 515–16. 
87 Id.
88 Simon, supra n. 12, at 155.
89 Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 519.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 521.
based on the shortcuts that have become known as heuristics and biases.92
Intuitive expertise develops within a particular domain or area of
expertise; it develops in stages and is limited in scope. Whether intuitive
expertise develops depends in large part on the situation in which experts
work, that is, their performance depends on the characteristics of the tasks
they are assigned.93
Kahneman and Klein concluded that expert intuition is more reliable
(1) when the expert’s prior experience occurs within an environment that
provides valid, or regular, cues and (2) when the expert has many opportu-
nities for practice and receives prompt, accurate, and consistent
feedback.94 For example, when a driver applies the brakes on a car, the
driver receives immediate and unambiguous feedback. With enough expe-
rience, the driver’s intuition about using the brakes becomes more reliable.
Similarly, anesthesiologists are thought to be better able to develop expert
intuition because the effects of their mistakes are quickly evident (their
patients wake up in the middle of the operation or don’t wake up at all)
while radiologists may not have the same intuitive reliability because their
mistakes (failing to detect an abnormality on an x-ray) take a while to
show up.95
Kahneman and Klein’s conclusions indicate that judges’ expert
intuition will be better when they make decisions in an environment that
is sufficiently regular, in the sense of having predictable outcomes, and
when the judge has had a chance to learn its regularities.96 In those
circumstances, the judge’s intuition may allow the judge to quickly size up
the situation as resembling a recognizable pattern or path and to generate
quick and accurate options. In environments that are less certain or where
the judge receives less or less-reliable feedback, judicial intuition is more
likely to consist of cognitive shortcuts that result in biased or misleading
judgments. 
As already noted, judges are not much different from the rest of us
when it comes to making judgments of the first kind. To give just one
example, researchers have flatly concluded that “[d]ecision makers are not
capable of predicting behavior, given the information that is available to
them.”97 No one appears to be very good at estimating damages, assessing
statistical probabilities, predicting the future, or judging credibility, casting
93 James Shanteau, The Psychology of Experts: An
Alternative View, in Expertise and Decision Support 11,
13–14 (G. Wright & F. Bolger eds., 1992). For example,
expertise is thought to develop more readily when the
expert is making decisions about objects or things rather
than about human behavior. Id.
94 Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 520. 
95 Daniel Kahneman, Don’t Blink! The Hazards of
Confidence, N.Y. Times Mag. (Oct. 23, 2011) (available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/ 23/magazine/dont-
blink-the-hazards-of-confidence.html).
96 Kahneman & Klein, supra n. 1, at 520. 
97 Ebbesen & Konecni, supra n. 16, at 192.
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doubt on our determinations of what custody arrangement will meet the
best interests of the child over time and whether a defendant will engage
in future criminal behavior. Judges, like most of us, find it difficult to
disregard relevant evidence, or to avoid shortcuts, predispositions,
stereotypes, and biases.98 Judges are not experts at finding facts or
weighing evidence.99 That judges have not developed expert intuition
when it comes to these kinds of judgments makes sense in terms of
Kahneman and Klein’s guidance: judges receive almost no meaningful
feedback on whether their prior judgments in similar situations have been
right or wrong.100
Still, there is reason to think judges are able to develop more-expert
and more-reliable intuition when they make choices in the second
category, problem solving. Expert intuition is more likely to develop when
certain conditions converge: the environment provides outcomes that are
more predictable and the decisionmaker receives feedback that is more
accurate and more consistent. So judges are more likely to become more
reliably intuitive when they are deciding issues that they decide frequently
in situations where they receive relatively prompt feedback (from lawyers,
parties, their clerks and colleagues, the community, the media, and even-
tually from appellate courts) even though the feedback may not be as
immediate or accurate as is ideal.
Research to date has not answered this question of whether judges
actually do develop reliable intuitive expertise in solving problems. The
existing research focuses on “the fact-finding and verdict-rendering tasks
that judges share with jurors” and “tends to slight those aspects of
judging—most obviously selecting the relevant law, interpreting the law,
and sometimes making law—that are more or less the exclusive province
98 Judges’ decisionmaking processes also appear to be affected by workloads and time pressures. See e.g. Bert I. Huang,
Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (2011); Brian Sheppard, Judging Under Pressure: A Behavioral Examination of the
Relationship Between Legal Decisionmaking and Time, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 931 (2012). 
99 Barbara A. Spellman, Judges, Expertise, and Analogy, in The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making, supra n. 47, at 154
(citing P.N. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105
Colum. L. Rev. 1124 (2005); Barbara A. Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in Evaluating Evidence, 156 U. Pa. L.
Rev. PENNumbra 1 (2007)). 
100 As noted earlier, the authors of Blinking on the Bench conclude that judges are unlikely to obtain the right kind of
feedback on their judgments. Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra n. 13, at 32. 
A 1992 review of the then-existing studies concluded that court judges were among the kinds of experts who appeared
to be less able to develop expertise, along with stockbrokers and clinical psychologists. Shanteau, supra n. 35, at 256–58. In a
later article, Shanteau and a coauthor wrote that there is “considerable empirical support for the view that experts are
competent in certain tasks specific to their domain” and “there are reasons to believe this view holds with respect to court
judges.” James Shanteau & Len Dalgleish, Expertise of Court Judges, in The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making, supra n.
47, at 269. Shanteau and Dalgleish suggested that previous judgment and decision researchers had “unknowingly adopted the
experts-should-be perfect view of expertise,” leading to the conclusion that experts are not as competent as might otherwise
be seen. Id. at 275. They pointed out that “the situations faced by experts are different and more complex than the simplified
situations considered by most analysts.” Id.
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of the judge.”101 Very little research about expert reasoning discusses
whether judges reason better or differently from others.102
One area in which judges may have developed reliable intuitive
expertise is the use of analogy. Barbara Spellman concludes that even if
judges are not experts in using analogy, “judges . . . know that when using
analogies it is important to look for relational similarities and—because of
their specialized training in legal content—they know which relational
similarities matter within their domains of expertise.”103 Thus, being an
expert in the use of legal analogies means seeing the importance of
structural similarities rather than being distracted by the similarities or
differences in surface features. 
The connections between studies of analogical processing and the
findings of expertise in intuitive problem solving are striking. An emerging
consensus by cognitive scientists surrounds a hybrid model of how
analogical processing works. This “structural alignment” model incor-
porates alignment and projection. First, a relevant analogy or metaphor is
accessed from long-term memory. The processor then begins mapping the
source onto the target to identify matches and align the corresponding
parts of the target and the source. The mapping allows analogical
inferences to be made about the target, creating new knowledge to fill in
gaps. The inferences are evaluated and adapted if needed. As a result, new
categories and schemas may be generated.104 For analogies, the model
showed that the most important similarities were found in the rela-
tionships within the domains rather than in the features of those
domains.105
Although it is doubtful that judges receive consistent and immediate
feedback from the appellate judges who occasionally review their
decisions, norms and conventions of judging may enhance the devel-
opment of reliable intuitive expertise. Judges are constantly engaged in a
back-and-forth process of making decisions, advancing positions and
receiving immediate feedback by listening to and reading the arguments of
counsel;106 many judges are required to produce written opinions; in at
101 Schauer, supra n. 47, at 104.
102 Id. at 113–14. As an example, Frederick Schauer identifies second-order legal reasoning—reasoning “not about what is,
but instead about what to do”—as one form of reasoning that “can plausibly be understood to set lawyers apart from others.”
Id. at 107–09.
103 Spellman, supra n. 99, at 149, 162 –63.
104 Keith J. Holyoak et al., Introduction: The Place of Analogy in Cognition, in The Analogical Mind: Perspectives from
Cognitive Science 1, 9–10 (Dedre Gentner et al., eds., 2001). 
105 Id. at 8.
106 Expertise takes time but also develops out of “deliberate practice, . . . study with appropriate feedback includ[ing] iden-
tifying errors and working on procedures to eliminate them.” Spellman, supra n. 99, at 163.
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least some courts, judges go through informal “pre-mortem” processes,
arguing with their clerks or with each other about what should be the
outcome.107
In summary, judges may reasonably be viewed as potentially expert
problem solvers when they are engaged in tasks that have not been tested
in psychological experiments, that is, “law-finding, law-applying, law-
interpreting, and law-making.”108 The analysis in the next section
tentatively supports application of the intuitive problem-solving approach
in at least the following situations: when there’s a question of the appli-
cation of old law to changed circumstances, when there’s new law to be
interpreted, or when two or more theories of law or lines of cases
reasonably could be applied. In other words, intuitive problem solving may
be helpful whenever the answer to what should happen next is open to
argument for reasons having more to do with the law than with uncer-
tainty about the facts. In these situations, not only is there no one right
answer, but an accurate result may not be a realistic goal; instead, the
judge may strive to make “a ‘reasonable’ (practical, sensible) decision, as
distinct from a demonstrably correct one.”109
III. Using Intuitive Problem Solving 
for Legal Persuasion
Persuasive lawyers must fashion appeals to both System 1 and System
2 thinking. From the point of view of intuitive problem solving, System 1
(or intuitive) thinking provides the openings that are essential for System 2
thinking to make a difference. This section explores examples of decision-
making that seem to be rooted in intuition. The appeals to System 1
thinking in these briefs and opinions look different because appeals to
intuition do not look like “legal” arguments. They are not based on
deduction from rules or analogies to precedent. Instead, these arguments
are invitations to ways of seeing: they appear more as sketches and less like
architectural renderings.
Through their work in the field, researchers who study naturalistic
decisionmaking have identified an expert problem-solving process.110 The
107 The authors of Blinking on the Bench found that the inappropriate use of intuition, in the form of hindsight bias, was less
influential when judges were asked to make a ruling on whether there was probable cause—and thus constrained by the rules
surrounding their judicial roles—rather than to predict an outcome. Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra n. 13, at
24–29.
108 Schauer, supra n. 47, at 104. 
109 Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 456 (1990). 
110 See Klein, Sources of Power, supra n. 2, at 15–30; Herbert A. Simon & Associates, Decision Making and Problem Solving,
in Research Briefings 1986: Report of the Research Briefing Panel on Decision Making and Problem Solving (1986) [hereinafter
Simon, Decision Making and Problem Solving].
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problem solver begins by recognizing that a problem-posing situation is
familiar and in some way typical.111 This recognition occurs through a
highly selective search through a number of options. Unlike laboratory
experiments, the search through options is highly selective in real-
problem situations because so many options are so frequently available.112
During the search, the problem solver uses rules of thumb as mental
shortcuts, performing quick evaluations to identify a possibly workable
course of action.113 In most situations, expert problem solvers look for the
first workable option, not the best one. Then they visualize or simulate
what would happen should they pursue that option. By imagining the
options being carried out one at a time, they are able to spot weaknesses
and improve the first workable option, making it less necessary to
compare alternative options to find the “best” one.114
When the problem solver is an expert, the expert relies on infor-
mation stored in memory and retrieved when the expert recognizes a cue
signaling that a particular piece of information is relevant.115 The ability to
use intuition to find the starting point of a good decision stems from an
expert’s learned capacity to recognize cues rapidly and to link them to a
large amount of stored knowledge. If intuition fails or a prospective
solution needs more study and evaluation, the expert “falls back on the
slower processes of analysis and inference.”116
A. Persuasion and legal problem solving
For lawyers and students of legal persuasion, the intuitive problem-
solving process appears to provide openings for persuasion. Intuition is
involved both in the lawyer’s recognition of the cues that might be
suggested to prompt judicial appreciation of particular alternatives and in
the judge’s recognition of the patterns and paths that might be tested.117
For both lawyer and judge, the process of “intuition” is the same as
that identified for expert problem solvers more generally: the situation
provides a cue or a prompt. This cue allows the lawyer to suggest a
comparison or the judge to tap into information stored in memory to find
111 Klein, Sources of Power, supra n. 2, at 24–25, 30.
112 Simon, Decision Making and Problem Solving, supra n. 110, at 12.
113 Klein, Sources of Power, supra n. 2, at 24–26, 30.
114 Id. at 26, 30.
115 Simon, Decision Making and Problem Solving, supra n. 110, at 13.
116 Id.
117 That is, judges “may choose relevant analogies (or precedents) as better or worse, applicable or inapplicable, not because
of any particular desired outcome but rather because of their own preexisting knowledge. The influence of such knowledge
on the decision process may be entirely unconscious.” Spellman, supra n. 99, at 149. 
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a comparison. Because “[i]ntuition is nothing more and nothing less than
recognition” of a parallel or alternative pattern or path, the flash of recog-
nition is only the first step. The intuitive problem-solving process blends
fast and slow thinking. First, it calls for the use of cues to prompt the
intuition to trigger recognition of parallels: these allow the judge to size up
the problem situation quickly and identify a workable option. Second, it
requires the judge to think through a mental simulation, which helps the
judge imagine how the responsive course of action might be carried out. 
During both movements, analogies, metaphors, perspectives, and
stories are the “sources of power” for lawyer and judge alike. Analogies,
metaphors, and perspectives enable the lawyer to tap into the judge’s expe-
rience by suggesting parallels between the current situation and
experiences the judge has had in the past.118 Storytelling guides the lawyer
and judge through the experimental simulation and testing of whether a
responsive course of action will be workable and what changes will be
needed. And finally, the frameworks provided by analogy, metaphor, and
storytelling organize, make sense of, and store past experiences so they
will be available to the decisionmaker in the future.119
B. Using analogy, metaphor, and perspective to prompt intuition
The results and recommendations set forth in the remainder of this
section are based on analyzing appellate briefs and opinions from the
perspective of intuitive problem solving. As will become clear, the
distinctive aspect of intuitive problem solving is that its beginning and its
ends are different from those of deductive legal reasoning. Rather than the
formal argumentation framework we might expect, it is possible to see in
these examples that a cue or a prompt has triggered the decisionmaker’s
intuitive recognition of a likeness or similarity, a pattern or path stored in
memory. The decisionmaker may be persuaded, it appears, not because
new information was provided to change the judge’s mind but because the
cue that led to the intuitive recognition allowed the judge to see the
situation in a changed way. 
118 Judge Posner also describes analogy as supporting the application of judicial intuition: 
Analogy belongs to the logic of discovery rather than to the logic of justification. Whether a judge in a common
law case starts with other cases or with some sense of what a reasonable decision on grounds of policy would be, he has
to make an initial selection from all possible cases, and all possible policy concerns, of those most relevant to the case
at hand. . . . At this stage, pattern recognition, a deeply ingrained capability of the human mind, plays a useful sorting
role.
Posner, How Judges Think, supra n. 67, at 183.
119 Klein, supra n. 2, at 286.
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1. Like it or not, judges will use their intuition.
Intuition is double-edged. A lawyer seeking to persuade an audience
will sometimes want a judge to rely only on the automatic, intuitive
processing of System 1 thinking (rather than on the more-complex
processing that begins, but does not end, with intuition). If the evidence is
that the defendant was carrying an umbrella and shaking water off his
jacket and shoes when he arrived at the crime scene, and the prosecutor
wants the judge or jury to conclude that the defendant had been walking
in the rain, there’s no need to apply the intuitive problem-solving
approach suggested here. The intuitive conclusion that the prosecutor
wants the decisionmaker to reach will arrive automatically. If, however, the
prosecutor wants the judge or jury to conclude on the same evidence that
the defendant had not been outside his apartment all day, the prosecutor
will have to provide a cue that prompts the decisionmaker’s intuition to
recognize a parallel that leads to a different result. Once the prosecutor
has turned the decisionmaker’s attention toward an alternative, but
parallel, path, the prosecutor’s argument will have to provide the infor-
mation needed to channel the decisionmaker’s thinking along the path. In
the first situation, intuition is enough. In the second, the persuasive lawyer
will need to imagine and provide a cue that triggers the door-opening
intuition of an alternative.
An example that appears to be the result of the automated, intuitive
processing of System 1 is found in Michael H. v. Gerald D.120 There, the
Supreme Court held that a birth or natural father has no protected
Constitutional interest in a relationship with his daughter. The second
paragraph of Justice Scalia’s opinion began,
The facts of this case are, we must hope, extraordinary. On May 9, 1976,
in Las Vegas, Nevada, Carole D., an international model, and Gerald D.,
a top executive in a French oil company, were married. The couple estab-
lished a home . . . . In the summer of 1978, Carole became involved in an
adulterous affair with a neighbor.121
Later in the opinion, Justice Scalia disagreed with the claim in the
dissent that his is a “pinched conception of ‘the family’”:
We disagree. The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society
. . . is typified, of course, by the marital family, but also includes the
household of unmarried parents and their children. Perhaps the concept
can be expanded even beyond this, but it will bear no resemblance to
120 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 121 Id. at 113.
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traditionally respected relationships—and will thus cease to have any
constitutional significance—if it is stretched so far as to include the rela-
tionship established between a married woman, her lover, and their
child, during a 3-month sojourn in St. Thomas, or during a subsequent
8-month period when, if he happened to be in Los Angeles, he stayed
with her and the child.122
Once a cue existing within the situation prompted Justice Scalia’s
intuition to recognize from his memory bank that this was an extraor-
dinary pattern—a pattern involving an international model, a French
oil-company executive, an adulterous affair with a neighbor, sojourns in St.
Thomas, and people who stay with other people merely because they
happen to be in the same town at the same time—the conclusion that such
a pattern could not constitute a family was easily reached. In this way,
Justice Scalia was able to further conclude that there is no constitutionally
protected “right to legal parentage on the part of an adulterous natural
father.”123 In doing so, he made clear that there was no contest about which
of the parties would be giving up a greater interest: “Michael by being
unable to act as father of the child he has adulterously begotten, or Gerald
by being unable to preserve the integrity of the traditional family unit he
and Victoria have established.”124
Why is this an example of judicial intuition recognizing a stored
pattern rather than an example of deductive reasoning? To deduce that the
natural father has no right to legal parentage, the argument would have to
begin with an accepted legal rule defining the family, parentage, or even
fatherhood. Instead, the intuition that this pattern was so extraordinary
that it could not constitute a family appears to have taken hold uncon-
sciously. Nowhere does Justice Scalia address the reasons for his thinking
that this situation is so extraordinary or that being unable to act as the
father of a child is giving up so little. Moreover, at least some of the
evidence supports a different conclusion about how a family might be
constituted: “The evidence is undisputed that Michael, Victoria, and
Carole did live together as a family; that is, they shared the same
household, Victoria called Michael ‘Daddy,’ Michael contributed to
Victoria’s support, and he is eager to continue his relationship with her.”125
In short, the decision in Michael H. appears to be based on the automatic,
intuitive processing of System 1. 
122 Id. at 123 n. 3.
123 Id. at 130 n. 7. 
124 Id. at 130. 
125 Id. at 143–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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2. The use of analogy to suggest parallel patterns may support intuitive
openings in interpreting the law.126
In law, arguments from analogy are thought to be structured as if they
were employing deductive logic. A holding is derived from a case, and the
advocate argues that the rule does or does not apply because the case is or
is not analogous. By contrast, the more common form of analogy or
comparison is based on factual similarity alone. When the lawyer suggests
such an analogy to evoke intuitive recognition of a similar pattern as the
first step in interpreting the law, the analogy is more of an implicit
comparison, often advanced in “hedging” or cautious language, designed
to subtly invite the judge to recognize a similarity.
An example may be found in the briefs filed in the lawsuit in which
the Supreme Court upheld the minimum-coverage provision of the
Affordable Care Act. In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts relied on
Congress’s tax power to uphold the constitutionality of the so-called
mandate.127 Although the tax power had been mentioned as one of the
arguments in favor of the provision, the legal fulcrum of the dispute was
thought to be Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.128
Justice Roberts began this section of the majority opinion by noting
that the tax-power argument required the Court to look at the statute
from a different perspective: 
In making its Commerce Clause argument, the Government defended
the mandate as a regulation requiring individuals to purchase health
insurance. The Government does not claim that the taxing power allows
Congress to issue such a command. Instead, the Government asks us to
read the mandate not as ordering individuals to buy insurance, but rather
as imposing a tax on those who do not buy that product.129
Even though Justice Roberts conceded that “[t]he most straight-
forward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to
purchase insurance,” given the majority’s holding that the Commerce
Clause does not authorize such a command, “it is therefore necessary to
ask whether the Government’s alternative reading of the statute—that it
only imposes a tax on those without insurance—is a reasonable one.”130 He
126 In Judge Posner’s view, whatever reasoning by analogy
is, “it is not the application, by means resembling deduction,
of clear, preexisting rules to found facts.” Posner, How Judges
Think, supra n. 67, at 180. Instead, he writes, “Analogies can
be suggestive, like metaphors, similes, and parallel plots in
literature . . . . But analogies cannot resolve legal disputes
intelligently.” Id. at 181. 
127 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012).
128 See e.g. id. at 2609 (Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(“This rigid reading of the [Commerce] Clause makes scant
sense and is stunningly retrogressive.”).
129 Id. at 2593 (Roberts, J.).
130 Id. at 2594.
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concluded that the alternative reading was reasonable because the
mandate “looks like a tax in many respects”: the payment for not having
health insurance is paid into the Treasury with tax returns; the
requirement “is found in the Internal Revenue Code and enforced by the
IRS”; and “it produces at least some revenue for the Government.”131 The
label given to the payment, a penalty rather than a tax, should not affect
the analysis of whether it is within Congress’s constitutional tax power. So,
Justice Roberts concluded, even though “[t]he Federal Government does
not have the power to order people to buy health insurance, . . . the Federal
Government does have the power to impose a tax on those without health
insurance.”132
The government briefs had relegated the tax-clause argument to a
backup alternative, but one amicus brief presented only the tax-power
argument and did so in depth, illustrating that once having prompted
recognition of a parallel path, lawyers can help judges visualize the
outcome of following that path. This brief argued that the challenged
provision addressed the problem of uncompensated healthcare services
“by requiring individuals either to purchase a minimally adequate health
insurance plan for themselves and their families or to pay an annual tax.”133
Because the provision “function[ed] as a tax . . . it was a ‘pecuniary burden
laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of supporting the
government,’” and because the provision itself contained numerous
references consistent with its characterization as a tax, including a specifi-
cation that the amount owing would be paid as part of an individual’s
annual tax requirements, the provision should be considered a tax and
within Congress’s tax powers.134
Why is this invocation of the tax power an example of an intuitive
prompt rather than a deductive argument based on analogy? Had there
been precedent holding that anything remotely similar to the minimum-
coverage provision should be viewed as a tax, the reliance on the tax
power likely would have followed the standard framework of building an
argument around analogous precedent. Here, however, the argument that
this provision functioned as a tax was primarily suggestive,135 providing
131 Id. (emphasis added).
132 Id.
133 Amici Curiae Br. of Const. L. Scholars in Support of
Petrs. (Minimum Coverage Provision), Nat’ Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 135050 at *3 (Jan. 13, 2012) (132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012)).
134 Id. at *5–6.
135 The dissenters characterized the government’s tax
argument as literally unprecedented:
The Government contends, however, as expressed in
the caption to Part II of its brief, that “THE
MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS INDE-
PENDENTLY AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS’S
TAXING POWER.” The phrase “independently
authorized” suggests the existence of a creature never
hitherto seen in the United States Reports: A penalty
for constitutional purposes that is also a tax for
constitutional purposes. In all our cases the two are
mutually exclusive.
Id. at 2650–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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another way of looking at the provision, and thus it opened up a potential
solution to the problem.
3. The use of metaphor to prompt recognition of patterns may support
changes in legal interpretation. 
Metaphor is a close cousin of analogy.136 Analogy retains its implicit
suggestiveness because of its phrasing (the minimum coverage provision
looks like a tax). Although metaphor appears more explicit (the minimum-
coverage provision is a bear), it retains its status as merely inviting a
comparison because it is nonliteral. In metaphor, even though the speaker
quite clearly says one thing, the listener most likely understands that the
meaning is something other than the literal definition of the words. 
In the following cases, the brief and opinion writers explicitly stated
that when the government compels a person to salute a flag or punishes a
person for wearing a jacket bearing an offensive message, the government
is regulating “speech.” The speech metaphor has become so accepted that
such statements seem almost literally true today, but at the time of these
decisions, characterizing such conduct “as” speech was unprecedented,
and the authors used the metaphor to prompt intuitive recognition of a
pattern that fit within First Amendment protection.
First, viewing the flag salute as if it were speech, the Supreme Court in
1943 overruled a decision made only a few years earlier and held that the
West Virginia State Board of Education had violated the First Amendment
when it compelled students to salute the flag and say the pledge of alle-
giance.137 In the opinion for the new majority, Justice Jackson wrote that
“[t]here is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is
a form of utterance.” Such symbolism is, he said, a “primitive but effective
way of communicating ideas.”138 By recognizing this pattern—that the flag
salute should be “seen as” speech—Justice Jackson was able to shift the
discussion away from the prior, unsuccessful claim by Jehovah’s Witnesses
that their religious beliefs should allow them to be free of the
requirements of a general rule regulating conduct in schools.139 By
metaphorically characterizing the flag salute as compelled speech, rather
than unprotected conduct, Justice Jackson was able to find that “the action
of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on their power.”140
136 Cognitive researchers have concluded that “metaphor is
like analogy” and shares the same basic processes:
“structural alignment, inference projective, progressive
abstraction, and re-representation.” Dedre Gentner et al.,
Metaphor Is Like Analogy, in The Analogical Mind:
Perspectives from Cognitive Science 202 (D. Gentner et al.
eds., 2001). 
137 W.V. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. V. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940)). 
138 Id. at 632. 
139 Id. at 635–36.
140 Id. at 642.
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Similarly, when Cohen v. California141 came before the Supreme
Court in 1970, the Court had very recently distinguished between unpro-
tected conduct and protected speech under the First Amendment.142 In
Cohen, the Court was asked to decide whether the defendant could be
punished for wearing a jacket bearing an offensive phrase. The brief for
the jacket-wearer prompted recognition of an alternative, but parallel,
path through its use of the metaphor of “speaking”:143
While in the courthouse corridor outside Division 20 of the Los Angeles
Municipal Court, Appellant wore a jacket upon which were inscribed the
words “Fuck the Draft.” Also inscribed on the jacket were the words
“Stop War” and two “peace symbols.” . . . Appellant testified that by
wearing the jacket as thus inscribed the public was made aware of the
depth of feeling against the draft shared by himself and his friends . . . .144
The Court had recently held that burning a draft card was conduct,
not speech,145 and thus not protected by the First Amendment, and the
dissent in Cohen concluded that “Cohen’s absurd and immature antic, in
my view, was mainly conduct and little speech.”146 But the author of the
Cohen brief (without pausing to discuss the conduct–speech distinction)
suggested recognition of the parallel path and then helped the deci-
sionmaker simulate the appropriate course of action:
We begin with the incontrovertible fact that Appellant was engaging in
speech. Since his expression was formulated in words, and since he was
arrested because of his words, there is presented in this case, at least
prima facie, an abridgment of Appellant’s freedom of speech in violation
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Highly respected authority has
advanced the view that speech is entitled to First Amendment protection
“without any ifs, buts, or whereases.”147
Once wearing a jacket was equated with speech, the brief followed the
path of a more conventional free speech argument—speech is protected
unless some special category applies.148 In an opinion by Justice Harlan,
the majority agreed.149
How do these uses of metaphor support intuitive problem solving
rather than merely exemplify arguments stating the proposition that some
141 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
142 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
143 Br. for Appellant, Cohen v. Cal., 1970 WL 122788 (Aug.
21, 1970) (403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
144 Id. at *7.
145 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
146 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
147 Br. for Appellant, supra n. 143, at *9.
148 Id. at *9–16. 
149 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
A REVISED VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL HUNCH 31
conduct is speech? The metaphorical process of “seeing as” does not
change what we see, but instead changes how we see it. Rather than
changing what exists, “[i]t imaginatively alters how we structure and color
our thoughts about what is so.”150 Again, the distinction is between a
prompt leading to recognition of a pattern already stored in the mind of
the decisionmaker and an argument seeking to change the mind of the
decisionmaker by providing new information. Had the brief writer been
pursuing the latter, the brief would have begun with a deductively
structured argument based on the distinction between conduct and
speech. Instead, the brief begins with the statement that Cohen was
engaging in speech. If the reader accepts that cue as evoking recognition
of the familiar path for speech claims, the rest of the brief need only follow
the path.
4. Prompting intuitive recognition of a perspective or worldview may
influence statutory interpretation.
When a metaphor is used as a prompt for recognition of a pattern in
our memory, it influences how we see something fairly discrete and
specific, such as a flag salute. Using a perspective, or an alternative
worldview, as a prompt can influence how we see a much broader range of
concepts. For example, if the decisionmaker’s overall perspective is that
every individual is solely responsible for his or her own success or failure,
that worldview will influence the patterns the decisionmaker is likely to
recognize in a range of situations.
Perspectives thus have the same effect as metaphors, but at a higher
level of generality: they are more general modes of interpretation and are
not tied to a particular subject. “[A] perspective provides an intuitive,
holistic principle for organizing our thoughts about some topic” around “a
complex structure of relative prominence . . . so that some features stick
out in our minds while others fade into the background, and by making
some features especially central to explain others.” A perspective may
carry attitudes, emotions, and values. Rather than a complete, complex
thought, a perspective provides a tool for thinking that “helps us to do
things with the thoughts we have: to make quick judgments based on
what’s most important, to grasp intuitive connections, and to respond
emotionally.”151
A comparison of excerpts from the majority and dissenting opinions
in a divisive legal argument illustrates the effects of evoking such
150 Elisabeth Camp, Two Varieties of Literary Imagination:
Metaphor, Fiction, and Thought Experiments, Midwest
Studies in Philosophy, XXXIII 116, 110–11 (2009). 
151 Id.
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perspectives. In the Supreme Court decision upholding the federal power
to regulate immigration and striking down major portions of Arizona’s
immigration statute,152 the majority and dissenting justices appeared to be
under the influence of two very different perspectives. In his opinion for
the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy describes the United States as a
nation of immigrants, but this is not the important metaphor. He charac-
terizes the power of the “Government of the United States” with regard to
immigration as “broad [and] undoubted,” resting not only on the
Constitution but also on the inherent power of a national sovereign to
conduct relations with foreign nations.153 He depicts a national
government that exercises its significant power with the restraint and
discretion necessary when human concerns are immediately at stake:
The National Government has significant power to regulate immi-
gration. With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of
national power over immigration depends on the Nation’s meeting its
responsibility to base its laws on a political will informed by searching,
thoughtful, rational civic discourse. Arizona may have understandable
frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration while that
process continues, but the State may not pursue policies that undermine
federal law.154
This characterization of the national government, its power, and its
restraint is the lens through which Arizona’s law may be seen as under-
mining federal law. From a larger perspective, Justice Kennedy views the
United States as a member of the international community of nations.155
Trying on this perspective, an audience might realign its patterns of
thought even if Justice Kennedy did not explicitly state the proposition
that only the national sovereign has the power to control and conduct
relations with foreign nations. 
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Antonin Scalia proposes a different metaphor: 
The United States is an indivisible “Union of sovereign States.”
Today’s opinion, approving virtually all of the Ninth Circuit’s injunction
against enforcement of the four challenged provisions of Arizona’s law,
deprives States of what most would consider the defining characteristic
of sovereignty: the power to exclude from the sovereign’s territory people
who have no right to be there.156
152 Ariz. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
153 Id. at 2498.
154 Id. at 2510. 
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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These characterizations accord prominence and centrality to the
sovereign character of the States, and they make the central feature of
sovereignty the power “to forbid the entrance of foreigners.”157 Justice
Scalia describes the “human realities” this way: “Arizona bears the brunt of
the country’s illegal immigration problem. Its citizens feel themselves
under siege by large numbers of illegal immigrants who invade their
property, strain their social services, and even place their lives in
jeopardy.”158
But this is not the only danger:
[T]he specter that Arizona and the States that support it predicted [has
come to pass]: A Federal Government that does not want to enforce the
immigration laws as written, and leaves the States’ borders unprotected
against immigrants whom those laws would exclude. So the issue is a
stark one. Are the sovereign States at the mercy of the Federal Executive’s
refusal to enforce the Nation’s immigration laws?159
Through the filter provided by Justice Scalia’s characterizations,
Arizona’s legislation is seen as warranted. Trying on his overall perspective
that the States have always had the authority to protect themselves from
foreign invasion, an audience might adjust its thinking to conclude that
when left unprotected, Arizona must have authority to act.
Arizona’s brief may well have prompted recognition of an overall
perspective or worldview already present in the reader’s mind and ready to
be activated:
Arizona and its 370-mile border are a conduit for rampant illegal entries
and cross-border smuggling to a degree unparalleled in any other State.
The public-safety and economic strains that this places on Arizona and
its residents have created an emergency situation . . . .160
[The result of federal enforcement efforts focusing on California and
Texas] has been the funneling of an increasing tide of illegal border
crossings into Arizona. . . . These illegal entries are not quick dashes
across the border. They instead often involve multi-day hikes by large
groups through rural areas, typically escorted by heavily armed
smugglers. This flood of unlawful cross-border traffic, and the accom-
panying influx of illegal drugs, dangerous criminals and highly
157 Id. at 2514.
158 Id. at 2522.
159 Id. at 2521.
160 Br. for Petrs., Ariz. v. United States, 2012 WL 416748 at
*1 (Feb. 6, 2012) (132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)).
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vulnerable persons, have resulted in massive problems for Arizona’s
citizens and government . . . .161
The City of Phoenix has experienced numerous “home invasions” and
hundreds of reported kidnappings . . . . 162
[L]arge portions of public and private lands have become extremely
dangerous and environmentally degraded.163
Private ranchers living near the border constantly face the epidemic of
crime, safety risks, serious property damage and environmental
problems . . . .164
The intuitive prompts for Justice Kennedy’s more outward-looking
worldview may have included the amicus brief filed by “former officials in
the foreign policy, defense, and national security establishments of the
United States government”:165
Immigration policy has been part and parcel of U.S. foreign relations
since the country’s founding. As this Court has recognized, the text,
history, and structure of the Constitution require that the U.S.
government speak with one voice on all issues of international relations.
. . . 166
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 illustrates the ways in which state immigration laws
can interfere with and thereby harm the Nation’s foreign relations. It
inherently undermines the exclusivity and uniformity of federal foreign
relations power, threatens negative consequences for U.S. relations with
other countries, and risks retaliation to U.S. citizens abroad.167
How do these briefs illustrate the use of prompts triggering intuitive
recognition of a perspective already familiar to the decisionmaker?
Although both briefs make the deductive legal arguments that would be
expected on one or the other side, these briefs also appear to be designed
to trigger an intuition that will filter the decisionmaker’s perceptions of the
facts and the legal arguments through the lens of a particular worldview.
In one brief, the pattern is etched by a heavy-handed but incompetent
federal government, unable or unwilling to protect an endangered state; in
the other brief, a portrait is drawn of state interference with the nation’s
necessary relationships with the rest of the world.
161 Id. at *2–3. 
162 Id. at *4. 
163 Id. at *5. 
164 Id. at *6. 
165 Amici Br. for Madeleine K. Albright et al. in support of
Respt., Ariz. v. United States, 2012 WL 1044365 at *2–3
(Mar. 26, 2012) (132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012)). 
166 Id. at *2.
167 Id. at *3.
A REVISED VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL HUNCH 35
5. The invocation of a familiar pattern may allow the decisionmaker to
avoid a more difficult question.
In the Appellant’s Brief in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,168 attorney (and former Solicitor General) Ted Olson first
prompts the reader to recognize a familiar pattern in the facts: Citizens
United has made a critical, fact-filled 90-minute documentary about a
political figure that an audience may want to watch. Because the reader is
familiar with the informative value and First Amendment protection
generally granted to documentaries, it is not a stretch for the legal
argument to begin with the text of the First Amendment: “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” and to immediately
claim that “[t]his constitutional injunction evidently was not in the
forefront of Congress’s mind when it enacted BCRA, a statute that
imposes sweeping restrictions on core political speech.”169
The brief supports its prompt evoking intuitive recognition—a docu-
mentary is valuable political speech—by discussing Citizens United’s
history of distributing its political views through documentary movies,
including movies about illegal immigration, the War on Terror, and the
United Nations.
These movies have been shown in theaters across the country and sold
on DVD by national retailers. A number of them have met with critical
and popular success. Citizens United’s 2007 documentary film
Rediscovering God in America, for example, was the top-selling historical
documentary on Amazon.com soon after its release.170
The current documentary is more of the same: Hillary: The Movie is a
biographical documentary about Senator Hillary Clinton, offering a
“critical assessment of Senator Clinton’s record as a U.S. Senator and as
First Lady in order to educate viewers about her political background.” In
fact, the documentary focuses on five specific situations: “the Clinton
Administration’s firing of the White House Travel Office staff; incidents of
official retaliation against a woman who accused President Clinton of
sexual harassment; Senator Clinton’s failure to adhere to campaign finance
restrictions while a candidate for U.S. Senate; her record on job-creation,
health-care, and national security issues; and the Clinton Administration’s
abuse of the pardon power.”171 Like any other documentary, it is based on
facts and interviews.172
168 Br. for Appellant, Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 2009 WL 61467 (Jan. 8, 2009) (130 S. Ct. 876
(2010)) .
169 Id. at *1–2.
170 Id. at *6–7 (citations omitted).
171 Id. at *6.
172 Id. at *7–8.
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Having invoked the familiar pattern, the brief goes on to help the
reader visualize the proper result, assuming the court accepts the brief ’s
assumption that as a documentary, the Citizens United production must
constitute political speech:
This Court has identified only one compelling interest that is even
conceivably sufficient to justify governmental restrictions on political
speech: preventing quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of such
corruption in the electoral process. 
[] Although that compelling anti-corruption interest may be served by
government restrictions on 30- or 60-second broadcast advertisements
that constitute express advocacy or its functional equivalent, that interest
is categorically inapplicable to restrictions on feature-length movies
distributed through Video On Demand. In contrast to short broadcast
advertisements—which generally target unwilling recipients—feature-
length movies are directed at a self-selected audience willing to invest 90
minutes of their time to watch a movie. And where that movie is offered
through Video On Demand, the viewers must affirmatively request the
movie from their cable provider. Hillary and other feature-length
political movies distributed through Video On Demand are therefore far
less likely than broadcast advertisements to reach and persuade
undecided voters and thereby influence the outcome of an election.
[]Moreover, any anti-corruption interest that the government might have
in regulating some feature-length political movies distributed through
Video On Demand would not reach movies that, like Hillary, are funded
primarily through individual donations.173
The Supreme Court majority subsequently held that corporate
spending for “electioneering communications” and candidate adver-
tisements during election campaigns was speech protected by the First
Amendment.174 The majority assumed that the spending regulated by the
statute not only constituted speech but in fact constituted political speech,
the most favored kind. 
How does the Olson brief illustrate the persuasive use of intuitive
problem solving? Rather than confront the legal question—whether
corporations are the kinds of speakers intended to be protected by the
First Amendment—the brief suggests that the relevant comparison is to a
documentary, the kind of speech that everyone agrees should be covered
by the First Amendment. The argument is not shaped by the typical
173 Id. at *12–13. 174 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310
(2010).
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framework of deduction and analogy. Instead, the brief invites the deci-
sionmaker to begin by seeing the strong factual comparison, opening the
way for the more complex evaluation process to follow. In this way, the
brief supports the view that there may be more effective “ways of changing
someone’s mind than changing his or her beliefs.” What we are after is not
so much different beliefs, but “changes in the associations and
comparisons one makes, differences in the vivid or ‘felt’ appreciation of
something already known, or changes in one’s habits of attention and
sense of the important and the trifling.”175
Conclusion
Lawyers and scholars (not to mention judges themselves) share an
abiding interest in explaining and influencing judicial decisionmaking.
Viewing judges as human beings makes more understandable the results
of studies showing that intuition regularly misleads judges when it comes
to making judgments. When we are asked to judge character, credibility, or
probability based on our perceptions, we should be forewarned that
intuition sometimes closes minds and excludes relevant facts: we choose
instead to rely on a quick picture or snapshot of what we are able to
observe.
But when it comes to solving problems, lawyers and judges should
turn to the decisionmaking research that illustrates the ways in which
intuition opens minds. By suggesting and inviting different ways of seeing,
intuition helps decisionmakers recognize both parallels and alternatives.
Rather than misleading decisionmakers, intuition in these circumstances
often leads to workable and effective decisions. 
Judges may reasonably be viewed as potentially expert problem
solvers when they are engaged in “law-finding, law-applying, law-inter-
preting, and law-making.”176 The analysis presented here supports lawyers
and judges in their use of intuitive problem solving when the answer to
what should happen next is just not clear.177 This may occur when there is
a question about whether it is still appropriate to apply old law to changed
circumstances, when new law has not yet been interpreted, and when two
or more theories of law or lines of cases could reasonably be applied to the
present situation. As in United States v. Jones, where applying two existing
lines of precedent left the important question unanswered, the intuitive
problem-solving approach might provide cues and prompts—taking the
175 Richard Moran, Seeing and Believing: Metaphor, Image,
and Force, 16 Critical Inquiry 87, 100 (1989).
176 Schauer, supra n. 47, at 104. 
177 See section III, supra.
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form of factual analogies, metaphors, and perspectives—that would enable
decisionmakers to envision a range of potentially workable solutions. 
For those who study and practice law, “intuition has a bad reputation
[especially when] compared with a judgment that comes from careful
analysis of all the relevant factors and shows each inference drawn and
traces the conclusion in a clear line to all of the antecedent conditions.”178
The argument here is that such analytical processes are not the only, and
sometimes not the best, sources for solving problems. Instead, loose ends
are good things to follow.179
178 Klein, supra n. 2, at 34. 179 Klein, supra n. 2, at 286–88. 
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